

PUTIN'S RUSSIA AND U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY

- Bibliography-

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Putin's Russia and U.S. Defense Strategy Workshop Bibliography

Workshop convened on 19-20 August 2015 by the
Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Center for the Study of WMD, National Defense University

In August 2015 the Center for Global Security Research and the Center for the Study of WMD jointly convened a workshop investigating questions related to Russian military strategy and appropriate U.S. response strategies at the National Defense University. Over the two days of the workshop, experts were asked to moderate discussion based on the ten topics and questions below. For each of these topics, we have compiled a short list of literature that will help analysts develop a baseline understanding of the issue. Compiled by Anthony Juarez.

1. [From Kosovo to Crimea: The Evolution of Russian Military Strategy](#)
How has Russia framed the problem of “detering and defeating a conventionally superior nuclear-armed major power and its allies?” How does Russia think about managing the risks of counter-escalation by NATO and the U.S.?
2. [The Conventional Level of War](#)
Do Russian military and political leaders believe hybrid warfare against NATO is viable? Why? How?
3. [The “Pre-Nuclear” Dimension](#)
How do Russian leaders expect to use long-range conventional strike, cyber, and space capabilities to induce NATO restraint?
4. [The Nuclear Dimension](#)
What are the separate, distinct roles of Russian theater and strategic forces in managing conflict in Europe?
5. [Understanding the Baseline](#)
What is the baseline deterrence and defense posture of NATO and the U.S. vis-à-vis Russia? What questions must be addressed in adapting that posture to new purposes?
6. [The Conventional Level](#)
Is there more that can and should be done at the conventional level to deter and defeat Russian aggression and coercion?
7. [On Missile Defense](#)
What role can and should missile defense play in deterring and defeating Russian aggression and coercion?
8. [On NATO's Nuclear Posture](#)
Is NATO's current nuclear posture adequate to the task? What is the task? If so, why? If not, what are the changes needed?
9. [On the Independent Strategic Forces of NATO's Three Nuclear Allies](#)
Are there separate actions by the U.S., UK, and/or France that would be useful and constructive?
10. [On Integrating Military and Political Objectives](#)
How should the U.S. and NATO align efforts to adapt and strengthen deterrence of Russia with efforts to leave the door open to a future rapprochement while also maintaining alliance solidarity?

1. From Kosovo to Crimea: The Evolution of Russian Military Strategy

Blank, Stephen J. (ed.). (2011). *Russian Military Politics and Russia's 2010 Defense Doctrine*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.
(<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1050.pdf>)

This volume examines Russian military doctrinal development, the politics behind it, and the doctrine's content as of March 2011. Though it does not cover the most recent update to Russia's military doctrine in 2014, it provides a thoughtful analysis of the evolution from its 2000 to 2010 doctrine.

Blank, Stephen J., and Richard Weitz (eds.). (2010). *The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.
(<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub997.pdf>)

With sections examining Russia's security strategy, military reform, and information warfare theory (among other topics), this volume attempts to help the reader understand the key issues and Western misperceptions relating to the Russian military and Russia's conception of security.

Hill, Fiona and Clifford G. Gaddy. (2013). *Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin*. Washington DC: Brookings.

Hill and Gaddy take a comprehensive look at the available information about Russian President Vladimir Putin in an attempt to understand his motivations and their implications for Russian policy. Though not specific to military strategy, their analysis of Putin gives insights into the factors that underpin Russian foreign policy and the military's role therein.

Keir, Giles and Andrew Monaghan. (2014). *Russian Military Transformation—Goal in Sight?* Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute.
(<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1196>)

The authors describe the recent military reforms the Russian Federation has implemented and the implications of those reforms on Russia's ability to use its armed forces to secure its foreign policy objectives. The authors note that while the military will not be able to meet all of its stated reform goals, it will be a much different force than that used in Georgia in 2008.

Kipp, Jacob and Roger McDermott. (10 June, 2014). Putin's Smart Defense: Wars, Rumors of War, and Generations of Wars (Part One). *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 11(104).
([http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=42480&no_cache=1#.Vdtjo6a0L8g](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42480&no_cache=1#.Vdtjo6a0L8g))

Kipp, Jacob and Roger McDermott. (17 June, 2014). Putin's Smart Defense: Wars, Rumors of War, and Generations of Wars (Part Two). *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 11(109).
([http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=42512&no_cache=1#.VdtkCqa0L8g](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42512&no_cache=1#.VdtkCqa0L8g))

In their two-part article, Kipp and McDermott explore the Kremlin's strategy used in Crimea that combined political, diplomatic, informational, and military tools. They examine new Russian strategies that blur the line between war and peace.

Kipp, Jacob. (25 January, 2012). Russian Sixth Generation Warfare and Recent Developments. *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 9(17).
([http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=38926&no_cache=1#.Vdtllaa0L8g](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38926&no_cache=1#.Vdtllaa0L8g))

Kipp explores late Russian Major-General Slipchenko's concept of "sixth generation warfare," which was coined after Operation Desert Storm showcased the "informatization" of conventional war—believed amongst some Russians to be a revolution in warfighting that allowed for "no-contact warfare." Kipp further explores the implications of Russia's inability to project force in a way similar to the United States, leading to a greater reliance on nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

2. The Conventional Level of War

Gerasimov, Valery. (5 February, 2014). The General Staff and the Country's Defense. *Moscow VPK Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer*. (<http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/18998>)

In this article, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov discusses the new expanded role of the General Staff in Russian military planning and strategy.

Johnson, Dave. (2015). *Russia's Approach to Conflict—Implications for NATO's Deterrence and Defence*. Rome: NATO Defense College. Research Paper no. 111.
(<http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=797>)

Johnson outlines how Russia perceives conflict and how it perceives itself to be in conflict with NATO. He dismisses the near-term possibility of developing a constructive relationship with Russia and discusses the implications of Russia's worldview.

Kofman, Michael and Matthew Rojansky. (April 2015). *A Closer Look at Russia's "Hybrid War."* Washington DC: Wilson Center. (<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7-KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf>)

Kofman and Rojansky investigate the meaning of the term "hybrid war" in the Ukrainian context, discounting it as a model for future Russian aggression (potentially in a NATO state). Instead, they characterize the Russian intervention in Ukraine not as a hybrid war, but as an exercise in the use of all elements of Russia's power to influence a region in a way it perceives to support its vital national interests.

McDermott, Roger. (11 February, 2014). "Gerasimov Unveils Russia's 'Reformed' General Staff," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 11(27).
([http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=%2041951#.VdzV4aa0L8h](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=%2041951#.VdzV4aa0L8h))

McDermott provides an analysis of Gerasimov's February 2014 article in *Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer*.

Thomas, Timothy. (2015). Russia's Military Strategy and Ukraine: Indirect, Asymmetric—and Putin-Led. *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 28. (<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Putin%27s-Russia/Russia%E2%80%99s%20Military%20Strategy%20and%20Ukraine%20article%20slavic%20mil%20studies.pdf>)

Thomas outlines Russian conception of strategy and how Russia may have applied it during its intervention in Ukraine. He stresses the central role of Putin in directing Russian strategy and the Russian military's dependence on non-military means to achieve its objectives.

3. The “Pre-Nuclear” Dimension

Carlsson, Marta, Johan Norberg, and Fredrik Westerlund. “The Military Capability of Russia’s Armed Forces in 2013.” In Hedenskog and Pallin, *Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective—2013*. Stockholm: FOI. (<http://www.foi.se/report?rNo=FOI-R--3734--SE>)

The authors’ section (pp. 23-64) in this volume specifically explores the expanding military capability of Russia’s armed forces in 2013. Russia’s improved long-range strike capabilities give it more options at the “pre-nuclear” stage.

Kokoshin, Andrei. (2011). *Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions*. Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. (<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Ensuring%20Strategic%20Stability%20by%20A.%20Kokoshin.pdf>)

Kokoshin, a former Russian legislator and sixth secretary of the Russian Security Council, discusses “pre-nuclear” deterrence and Russia’s capability to deter via its conventional military capabilities (see pp. 57-58).

Kokoshin, Andrei. (2015). Strategic Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Deterrence: Priorities in the Modern Age. *Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences*, 84(3). DOI: 10.7868/S0869587314030086.

Continuing the strain of thought of his 2011 piece, Kokoshin discusses the importance of “pre-nuclear” deterrence as a complement to Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. He stresses the importance of conventional long-range precision weapons to deterring a potential adversary and managing escalation.

McDermott, Roger. (2011). “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces: Reform and Nuclear Posture to 2020.” In Stephen J. Blank, (ed.). *Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present and Future* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. (<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB1087.pdf>)

In his section of this volume (specifically starting on page 68) McDermott details how Russian thinkers have started to understand that nuclear weapons are not an absolute security guarantor. Though he describes Russian conventional capabilities as insufficient for providing a conventional deterrent at that time (Carlsson, et al. detail how those capabilities are changing).

Thomas, Timothy. (2014). Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy: Can the Nation Cope in Future Conflicts? *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 27(1). (<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13518046.2014.874845>)

This article discusses Russia’s information and cyber warfare concepts. It updates information based on old paradigms and introduces several new developments that are influencing the current paradigm. It examines the potential shape of Russia’s cyber strategy and offers a prediction as to how it might ‘cyber cope’ in future conflict.

4. The Nuclear Dimension

Durkalec, Jacek. (2015). *Nuclear-Backed “Little Green Men:” Nuclear Messaging in the Ukraine Crisis*. Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs. (<http://www.pism.pl/publications/PISM-reports/Nuclear-Backed-Little-Green-Men-Nuclear-Messaging-in-the-Ukraine-Crisis>)

Durkalec provides an analysis of the nuclear undertones of the 2014 Ukraine crisis, NATO’s response, and NATO options for its nuclear policy.

Sokov, Nikolai N. (2014). Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike “de-escalation.” *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*. (<http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation>)

Sokov analyzes Russia’s military doctrine and the concept of a de-escalatory nonstrategic nuclear strike in a conventional conflict to end hostilities on Russian terms.

5. Understanding the Baseline

Delpech, Thérèse. (2012). *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. (http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1103.pdf)

Delpech makes the argument for renewed thinking on nuclear deterrence in the 21st century and draws from decades of RAND deterrence literature to sketch a picture of the new security environment. She characterizes the contemporary security environment as one where *strategic piracy*, or strategic lawlessness and recklessness, may be more prevalent.

Kulesa, Łukasz (ed.). (2012). *The Future of NATO’s Deterrence and Defence Posture: Views from Central Europe*. Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). (https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=12567)

A few months after the release of NATO’s DDPR, Kulesa and the volume’s other contributors assess NATO’s deterrence and defense posture from the perspective of Central Europe.

N.A. (May 2012). *Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR)*. NATO. (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm)

In the DDPR, NATO assesses the role of each component of its deterrence and defense posture (nuclear, conventional, missile defense, arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation) and commits itself to maintaining the “appropriate mix” of capabilities to fulfill the responsibilities set out in its Strategic Concept.

Wallander, Celeste. (July 2013). *Mutually Assured Stability: Establishing US-Russia Security Relations for a New Century*. Washington DC: Atlantic Council. (<http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/mutually-assured-stability-establishing-us-russia-security-relations-for-a-new-century>)

Wallander assesses U.S. and Russian perception of strategic stability within the context of Mutually Assured Destruction and concludes that Mutually Assured Stability is the best path forward in the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship.

6. The Conventional Level

Dobbins, James, et al. (2015). *Choice For America in a Turbulent World*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
(http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1114/RAND_RR1114.pdf)

In the sections specific to Europe (pp. 28-31, 85-91), the authors outline the force structure requirements necessary in Eastern Europe to prevent a potential Russian *coup de main*. The authors also outline the choices America and NATO have with regards to security in Europe vis-à-vis Russia.

Lindley-French, Julian. (2015). *NATO and New Ways of Warfare: Defeating Hybrid Threats*. Rome: NATO Defense College. Conference Report, 29-30 April, 2015.
(<http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=814>)

Lindley-French summarizes the conference in one core message: “A full spectrum NATO for full spectrum threats.” The report advocates for a realignment of NATO priorities and capabilities coupled with measures to increase NATO cohesion.

Morgan, Forrest E. (2012). *Dancing With the Bear: Managing Escalation in a Conflict With Russia*. *IFRI Proliferation Papers*, 40. (<http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp40morgan.pdf>)

Building on previous work by the RAND Corporation, Morgan explores the escalation risks that would be present in a conflict with the Russian Federation. Morgan advocates for an approach based on threshold management, or the manipulation of escalation mechanisms to keep conflict within the belligerents’ escalation thresholds.

Morgan, Forrest E. (2013). *Crisis Stability and Long-Range Strike: A Comparative Analysis of Fighters, Bombers, and Missiles*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
(http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/MG1200/MG1258/RAND_MG1258.pdf)

Morgan explores the effects of long-range strike systems (strike fighters, bombers, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles) on crisis stability and whether any of these systems are more conducive to crisis stability than the others.

7. On Missile Defense

Piotrowski, Marcin (ed.). (2013). *Regional Approaches to the Role of Missile Defence in Reducing Nuclear Threats*. Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM).
(https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=14446)

Piatrowski and the volume’s other contributors discuss the role of missile defense from a Central European Point of view. Each contributor prescribes specific steps to enhance NATO’s deterrence and defense posture.

Roberts, Brad. (2014). *On the Strategic Value of Ballistic Missile Defense*. *IFRI Proliferation Papers*, 50. (<http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp50roberts.pdf>)

Roberts provides an American perspective on the strategic value of ballistic missile defense (BMD) in today’s security environment. Roberts also addresses questions related to BMD and strategic stability with Russia (and China).

Wilkening, Dean. (2012). Does Missile Defence in Europe Threaten Russia? *Survival*, 54(1). (<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2012.657531#abstract>)

Wilkening characterizes the discourse on missile defense in Europe and Russia's assessment that missile defense threatens strategic stability. Wilkening assesses the technical merit of this argument and concludes that Russian concerns are overstated given the technical limitations of U.S. systems.

8. On NATO's Nuclear Posture

Kroenig, Matthew, et al. (2015). Forum: NATO and Russia. *Survival*, 57(2). (http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Forum_NATO%20and%20Russia.pdf)

Steven Pifer, Lukasz Kulesa, Egon Bahr, Götz Neuneck and Mikhail Troitskiy take on Matthew Kroenig's conclusions in a previous *Survival* piece in which he argues NATO must revamp its nuclear portfolio given the shifting security landscape in Europe. Kroenig responds to the core arguments levied by each commentator and maintains that, just as it has at the conventional level, NATO must reevaluate its nuclear capabilities, strategy, and posture.

Kroenig, Matthew and Walter B. Slocombe. (August 2014). Why Nuclear Deterrence Still Matters to NATO. *Atlantic Council Issue Brief*. (http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Why_Nuclear_Deterrence_Still_Matters_to_NATO.pdf)

Kroenig and Slocombe argue that nuclear weapons remain a relevant part of NATO's defense policy. They assess which actors these weapons are intended to deter and what they may deter them from.

Kroenig, Matthew. (2013). Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes. *International Organization*, 67(1). (http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Nuclear%20Superiority%20and%20the%20Balance%20of%20Resolve.pdf)

Kroenig articulates a relationship between nuclear superiority and the balance of resolve. Using a new data set, he finds that states with nuclear superiority are more likely to "win" nuclear crises. If valid, his findings have implications for NATO/US crisis outcomes in Europe vis-à-vis Russia's nonstrategic nuclear superiority.

Larsen, Jeffrey A. and Kerry M. Kartchner (eds.). (2014). *On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

In their edited volume, Larsen, Kartchner, and their contributors explore the possibility of limited nuclear war (if it can stay limited) and its implications. Thomas Mahnken's section outlines a few possible scenarios of limited nuclear use. Other authors assess the ability to manage and end conflict above the nuclear threshold as well as U.S. preparedness for such a contingency.

Lieber, Kier A. and Daryl G. Press. (2013). The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict. *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 7(1). (<http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/kal25/publication-69263.pdf>)

Lieber and Press argue that technological advancements and other contemporary circumstances have made counterforce nuclear targeting (targeting against the nuclear forces of an adversary) possible. They also argue deterring nuclear escalation in conventional conflicts will be harder than before, presenting policy makers with the task of balancing counterforce capabilities to deter adversarial aggression against the risk of starting a Cold War-style arms race.

Murdock, Chris A., et al. (2015). *Project Atom: A Competitive Strategies Approach to Defining U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Posture for 2025-2050*. Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. (http://csis.org/files/publication/150716_Murdock_ProjectAtom_Web_Rev2.pdf)

The authors used a competitive strategies approach soliciting proposals from the National Institute for Public Policy, the Stimson Center, and the Center for New American Security to conduct a “blue sky” review of U.S. nuclear strategy and posture. They make specific recommendations for future U.S. nuclear strategy and posture.

Nichols, Tom, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland (eds.). (2012). *Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. (<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1103.pdf>)

The only weapons forward deployed in Europe are B61 nonstrategic (“tactical”) bombs, which are deployed in allied territory through NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements. Though written before the Ukraine crisis, this piece explores the history and role of tactical nuclear weapons in the NATO alliance.

Payne, Keith, et al. (2014). *Nuclear Force Adaptability for Deterrence and Assurance: A Prudent Alternative to Minimum Deterrence*. Washington, DC: National Institute Press. (<http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/MD-II-for-web.pdf>)

The authors delineate the new threats posed by the current strategic landscape and the implications for the U.S. in ensuring credible deterrence and allied assurance. They advocate for flexible and diverse options to deal with the dynamic and ambiguous threat environment, with specific implications for NATO nuclear policy.

9. On the Independent Strategic Forces of NATO’s Three Nuclear Allies

Lewis, Jeffrey and Bruno Tertrais. (2015). Deterrence at Three: US, UK and French Nuclear Cooperation. *Survival* 57(4). (<https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2015-1e95/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-august-september-2015-c6ba/57-4-03-lewis-and-tertrais-1859>)

Lewis and Tertrais describe the crisis management failures of NATO’s three nuclear armed members and steps that could be taken to improve their collective crisis management ability.

10. On Integrating Military and Political Objectives

Gotkowska, Justyna. (April 2015). *NATO’s Presence in the Baltic States—Reassurance of Allies or Deterrence for Russia?* Warsaw: The Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW). (<http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-04-29/natos-presence-baltic-states-reassurance-allies-or-deterrence>)

Gotkowska evaluates whether the increased U.S. involvement in the Baltic States since Russia’s intervention in Ukraine serves an assurance or deterrence role to America’s allies or Russia, respectively. She argues that a lukewarm presence in Eastern Europe by NATO allies could further embolden Russia if it perceives NATO actions as attempts to assure the Baltic States.

N.A. (December 2014). *Report on U.S.-Russia Relations*. Washington DC: U.S. Department of State International Security Advisory Board. (<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/235118.pdf>)

This study, chaired by Ambassador Linton Brooks, evaluates the state of U.S.-Russia relations. The report recommends steps to be taken to improve relations with Russia without compromising important U.S. interests.

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